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UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT AND 
CAPITALIST PERIPHERALISA TION: 
THE CASE OF IRELAND 
PROINNSIAS BREATHNACH t 
Introduction 
Spatial unevenness has been a consistent feature of capitalist 
development since its original rise to prominence in early modern 
Britain. This is not to say that uneven development is an exclu-
sively capitalist phenomenon (nor, for that matter, that .it is a 
necessary feature of capitalism - a question that will be discussed 
in the conclusion to this paper). Clearly, differences in levels of 
technology and geographical variation in natural resource endow-
ments can give rise to variable levels of development, regardless 
of economic system - although geographers, and other social 
scientists, may have been inclined to ·overstress these factors, 
thereby providing an ideological smoi<escreen for more funda-
mental processes of uneven development under capitalism 
(Smith, 1984: 100). Certainly, nowadays, the distribution of 
natural resources has, at best, only a minor influence on the 
overall geography of capitalist investment and employment 
creation. 
Apart from natural resource endowment, uneven development 
has occurred in the non-capitalist past through the transfer of 
surplus between social formations via plunder or enforced tribute 
exaction. This would normally have involved formations with no 
structural economic interlinkages, although there have been 
examples of structural reorganisation of regions by externalforces 
for the purpose of systematic surplus extraction, as witness the 
introduction of slave-based commodity production into Western 
Europe by the Roman Empire (Anderson, 1978: 59-64). 
Uneven development, however, reached its apotheosis with the 
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emergence of capitalism as an iniegratea system of global dimen-
sions. Under capitalism, uneven development has assumed a con-
sistent structural configuration: the systematic exploitation by a 
set of dominant core regions of a corresponding set of peripheral 
dependent regions, the former therefore becoming centres of 
centripetal surplus accumulation and the latter sources of surplus 
extraction. However, while this basic conceptual model has • 
tended to remain constant, the actual mechanisms of dominance 
and exploitation have changed over time, as has the detailed 
geography of cores and peripheries, with some former peripheries 
subsequently attaining core status, and vice versa. This reflects 
the remarkable adaptability of capitalism to changing historical 
circumstances. · 
In this paper, three major phases of capitalist core- periphery 
relations are identified, namely, mercantilism, the 'old' inter-
national division of labour and the more recent (and, as yet, 
incipient) 'new' international division of labour. The mechanisms 
of peripheralisation (i.e. the methods by which certain regioris are 
reduced to, or maintained in, a subordinate or peripheral status 
by dominant core regions) associated with each phase are first 
briefly outlined. A detailed case study of Ireland, which has 
experienced all three forms of peripheralisation, is then presented 
to illustrate the functioning of these mechanisms. The paper 
concludes with a discussion of the role of uneven development 
within the overall functioning of the capitalist system. 
Capitalist peripheralisation: a periodisation 
The initial phase of capitalist core-periphery relations predated the 
full flowering of industrial capitalism, and revolved around the 
articulation, through the medium of merchant capitalists, of long-
distance trading relationships between mainly non-capitalist pro-
ducers, including petty commodity producers in England, other 
parts of Western Europe, and Northeast America, slave-based 
production elsewhere in the Americas, and communal and 
tribute-paying producers in Africa and Asia. This phase saw the 
subjugation of st'!te policy to commercial interests (especially in 
England), as expressed in the emergence of mercantilism; where 
foreign - and particularly colonial - policy became devoted to 
the emichment of the home country through external relation-
ships and where political and military power were directed to the 
attainment of this objective, thereby initiating systematic dorni-~ 
nation and exploitation of overseas territories in the interests of 
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the commercial classes at home (Regan;~1980: 6 -7; Anderson, 
1979: 35 -7). Mercantilism sought, therefore, to create com-
plementarity in the economic relations between colony and home 
country, with the colonies being diverted away from pursuing 
lines of production already established at home, and towards 
-supplying products not produced at home (mainly for environ-
mental reasons). 
This incipient international division of labour became a centre-
piece of the second phase of core- periphery relations under capi-
talism, following the industrial revolution in Britain and 
subsequently elsewhere. The competitive power of mass pro-
duction now supplemented deliberate state policy in inhibiting -
and in some cases dismantling - industrial production in captive 
colonies. In place of the luxury consumer products (sugar, spices) 
which were emphasised in the mercantilist phase, colonies were 
now seen increasingly as sources of raw materials and foodstuffs 
for the factories and rising urban populations of the industrialis--
ing home countries. As Marx's celebrated quote put it: 'A new and 
international division of labour, a division suited to the require-
ments of the chief centres of modern industry springs up, and 
converts one part of the globe into a chiefly agricultural field of 
production, for supplying the other part which remains a chiefly 
industrial field' (Marx, 1961: 451). Of course, towards the end of 
the nineteenth century, minerals also became an important element 
of many peripheral economies. 
In this second phase, colonial agricultural production remained; 
for the most part, non-capitalist in form, but articulated with the 
increasingly capitalist production systems of the home countries 
through unequal exchange relations which, combined with the 
considerable enhancement of the value of colonial raw materials 
through the manufacturing process, ensured that general stan-
dards of living in the colonial periphery fell far below those 
obtaining in the core regions .. 
The third - and present - phase of core- periphery relations 
has only come to prominence since the 1960s, and involves the 
increasing diffusion of capitalist relations of production to the 
_ periphery, albeit in subordinate form. This is achieved mainly via 
the medium of transnational investment (particularly in manufac-
turing industry), whereby industrial production in the periphery 
remains under the direct control of the core. The unequal trading 
relationship between capitalist and non-capitalist forms of pro-
duction which characterised the second phase continues, but is 
now supplemented by direct appropriation of surplus value from 
wage labour across international boundaries. The emergence of 
UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT AND CAPITALIST PERIPHERALISATION 125 
this phase coincides with the virtual-completion of the process 
of decolonisation of the Third World and the consequent spread of 
more indirect 'neo-colonial' mechanisms of exploitation of the 
periphery by the core. This phase sees a 'new' international div-
ision of labour emerging, whereby routine industrial production 
increasingly joins primary production as a peripheral activity, 
while the core regions increasingly specialise in high-level (and 
high-income) service functions such as administrative control, 
research and development and producer services, thereby 
preserving - and exacerbating - the iJtcome disparity between 
core and periphery (Frobel et al., 1989; Massey, 1984; Peet, 1986). 
This paper does not propose to examine the factors which 
accounted for the emergence of the original capitalist core areas 
or for subsequent rearrangements of the global core- periphery 
system. Rather, the main purpose of the pap~r is to illustrate the 
functioning of the three phases of core- periphery relations ident-
ified above in relation to Ireland- England's first colony - which, 
apart from a particular regional exception, has experienced all 
three forms of peripheralisation. The specific spatial forms which 
dependent peripheral development has taken in the Irish case will 
be outlined, and the case study will conclude by demonstrating 
how, although Ireland's peripheral status has remained 
unchanged, there has been a recent geographical shift in the core 
with respect to which this peripherality is defined, with the 
continental EEC 'heartland' increasingly occupying the position 
hitherto held by Britain. 
Phase 1: Mercantilism 
Prior to the initial rise of capitalism in England in the early modern 
period, Ireland's economy was essentially feudal in structure~ 
Although clan-based, early medieval Gaelic society contained 
many feudal-type elements (0 Comiin, 1972). There was some 
long-distance trade . which was significantly expanded with the 
establishment of Viking settlements around the coast. Intermit-
tent attempts to create a centralised 'high kingship' from the end 
of the tenth century probably reflect .a general growth of surplus 
production. The incursion of a group of Anglo-Norman adven-
turers in the late twelfth century brought with it a more advanced 
form of feudal organisation. The superior military technology of 
this group allowed them to carve out substantial landholdings in 
the more fertile eastern and southern parts of the island. The 
Anglo-Normans subsequently became deeply gaelicised and, 
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while in many cases they expressed riominlflloyalty to the King of 
England, as was generally typical of the feudal system, they 
functioned effectively as independent local magnates. To the 
extent that it existed at all, England's monarchical jurisdiction was 
confined to the restricted area around Dublin known as the 'Pale'. 
Things changed fundamentally in the sixteenth century when, 
as part of the general centralising aspirations of the absolutist 
Tudor monarchy (Anderson, 1979: 113 -142), the local powe:r.... 
bases of Irish society were systematically broken down, a process 
that was complete by the end of the century. An added consider-
ation here was the English fear, following the failure of the Irish 
nobility, both Gaelic and Anglo-Norman, to embrace the 
Protestant Reformation, of possible alliances between Ireland and 
Catholic powers on the European continent, especially Spain. As 
a means of pacifying the last bastion of Gaelic resistance - the 
northern province of Ulster - the land in this region was 
expropriated and transferred in substantial blocks to a variety of 
English and Scottish speculators who undertook to bring in 
settlers to occupy the land as tenant farmers. This augmented 
spontaneous settlement in the eastern part of the province 
emanating from nearby Scotland which had already taken place 
(Pringle, 1985: 98 -104). 
These Protestant settlers, for the most part, occupied the best 
land in the region, with the native Catholic population generally 
being displaced to the marginal areas where, nonetheless, they 
still had to pay rent to their new landlords. Thus was laid th~ 
foundation for long-lasting sectarian conflict in the province. The 
new settlers, originating for the most part from the densely-
populated lowlands of Scotland and England where commercial 
agriculture was already established, introduced a much more 
commercial orientation to their productive activities than had 
been the norm previously in feudal Ireland. This commercial 
orientation was subsequently extended to the remainder of the 
island following the general expropriation of Catholic landholders 
in the heel of the Cromwellian and Williamite Wars and the 
transfer of their land to a further wave of British speculative 
landlords. However, in this case, there was no accompanying 
plantation of settlers, so that the native Irish were kept on as rent-
paying tenants. Thus, the proportion of Irish land owned by 
Catholics declined from 59% in 1641 to 14% in 1703, and shrunk 
further to 5% by 1776 (Regan, 1980: 4- 5). 
The growing commercialisation of the Irish economy was greatly_ 
constrained by a series of mercantilist impositions by the English 
government in the second half of the seventeenth century. A 
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series of Navigation Acts largely confinea tli~i"carriage of Ireland's-
external trade to English ships and the mediation of English 
merchants. Despite its excellent position relative to international 
shipping movements, Ireland has never since developed a 
merchant naval tradition. A further series of acts in the 1660s, 
introduced at the instigation of English livestock producers who 
were feeling the effects of Irish competition, prohibited the export 
to England of cattle, sheep and pigs - the staple products of IriSh 
agriculture. As a consequence, Irish agriculture became oriented 
towards the supply of provisions for the American colonial 
markets - markets which were much more unstable than the 
internal English market, giving rise to wild fluctuations in prices 
and recurrent crises for Irish producers (Regan, 1980: 7- 8). 
Perhaps the most far-reaching mercantilist measure of all, in 
terms of the future development of the Irish economy, was the 
1699 Woollen Act, which effectively prohibited the export o! 
woollen goods from Ireland, in the interests of the powerful 
English woollen lobby. Thus an emerging manufacturing sector 
which had been growing in tandem with its English counterpart 
was sent into sudden decline. Similar restrictions on the brewing, 
glass and sugar refining industries followed in the eighteenth 
century. 
These measures set the course for the future development of the 
Irish economy, which. henceforth was to act as a• specialist agricul-
tural producer with little industrial development. The Irish 
economy was to come under the control of commercial farmers 
and associated merchants for whom there were few local indus-
trial outlets for the reinvestment of profits. Accordingly, profits 
were invested in land and buildings in Ireland, or outside the 
island altogether in British industry and particularly in British 
government stocks. Irish capital, therefore, became concentrated 
among owners to whom risk-taking productive investments 
became increasingly alien - a situation which has changed little 
today, and which ensured that when such investment oppor-
tunities did become available subsequently when circumstances 
changed, they were rarely availed of (Regan, 1980: 8; Pringle, 
1985: 122- 6). 
There was, however, one outstanding exception to this gener-
alisation. The linen industry, thought to have been introduced 
into Ulster by Protestant refugees from mainland Europe, had no 
-direct competitor within England, and hence was allowed to 
develop unhindered. This it did at a rapid rate, to the extent that 
by 1800, exports, al38 million yards, were 76 times the level of a 
century previously (Regan, 1980: 8). Being still based on handcraft 
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production, this rapid growth in 'output l"ed to a diffusion of the 
industry from its point of origin in the northeast throughout much 
of rural Ireland, where it became a key element in the household 
income of smallholders and the growing numbers of cottiers 
(families occupying tiny plots for the production of subsistence 
crops) and landless labourers. The expansion of the linen industry 
indicates the extent to which mercantilism was oriented to serving 
narrow vested interests within the home country rather than 
representing a general policy of restricting development in the 
colonies. 
Phase 2: The 'old' international division of labour 
While the effect of the mercantilist phase was to orient the Irish 
economy towards agricultural specialisation (with the exception of 
the linen industry), it also forced Irish exporters to look beyond-
England for export markets, as the products of Irish agriculture 
were essentially the same as those of England, and were therefore 
excluded from the English market at the behest of English pro-
ducers. However, as the pace of British industrialisation accelerated 
in the second half of the eighteenth century, rapid population and 
urban growth meant that domestic producers were increasingly 
unable to supply the demands of the food market, with the result 
that restrictions on imports from Ireland had to ·be relaxeci. 
Accordingly, the Irish economy became increasingly lo<;!<ed into 
the British, as an exporter of agricultural products and importer of 
manufactured goods, in line with the classic international division 
of labour identified by Marx in the quotation cited earlier in this 
paper. Indeed, as Marx (1961: 711) himself noted, Ireland's 'true 
destiny' was 'that of an English sheep-walk and cattle-pasture.' 
Thus, by 1800, 85% of Irish exports were destined for Britain, and 
78% of imports were sourced therefrom, compared with figures of 
46% and 54%, respectively, for 1700 (Regan, 1980: 9-10). 
Although, climatically, Ireland is not particularly suited to 
tillage, towards the end of the eighteenth century there was a 
gradual shift towards this form of agricultural production as a~ 
result of high prices and government bounties. This trend was 
accelerated by the outbreak of the Napoleonic wars, which 
required the feeding of large standing armies at a time when 
continental grain sources were cut off. The resultant increase in 
demand for farm labour underwrote a sudden surge in the Irish 
population growth rate: between 1781 and 1821 the total popu-
lation rose from four millions to almost seven millions (Crotty, 
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1986: 43). This increase consisted mahuf ofcottiers and landless 
labourers, whose sustenance became increasingly dependent on 
the extension of potato cultivation, mainly on tiny plots. 
By 1800, therefore, the Irish economy had become characterised_ 
by a much-bloated labour force heavily dependent on what was to 
prove an ephemeral export market. The dangers this situation 
presented, particularly to the most vulnerable sections of this 
labour force - the cottiers/labourers - became apparent after .the 
cessation of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, which ushered in_ 
industrial Britain's first sustained depression. Food (especially 
grain) prices fell drastically, and Irish farmers began to revert to 
the more traditional pastoral agriculture, with its low labour 
requirements. The deteriorating position of the Irish economy was 
further aggravated by the coming into full effect in the 1820s of the _ 
economic provisions of the Act of Union of 1800, whereby Ireland 
was incorporated as an integral component of the United Kingdom. 
The free trade conditions which resulted from these provisions 
dealt a further blow to indigenous, manufacturing industry 
(especially the cotton and woollen industries serving the home 
market), much of which was unable to withstand competition 
from its more technologically-advanced British counterparts. 
The impending crisis was given further impetus by the rapid 
mechanisation of the linen industry from the late 1820s onwards. 
This gave rise to spatial concentration in the Belfast region, 
thereby removing the second crutch upon which the rural under-
classes depended. The latter became a true 'wretched of the 
earth', increasingly eking out a living from potato patches on 
common and marginal land, and increasingly vulnerable to recur-
rent attacks of blight on the potato crop. The momentum of popu-
lation growth swamped the rising flow of emigration: by 1841 the 
total population had reached 8.5 millions. The complete failure of 
the potato crop in successive years in the late 1840s produced 
results which were interpreted at the time as representing the 
'natural' outcome of Malthusian population principles (Dunford 
and Perrons, 1983: 64- 5). In fact, while nearly one million people 
died (mainly from disease) and another million emigrated in the 
space of five years, Irish commercial farmers continued to export 
large quantities of livestock and other food products to the British 
market. This phenomenon of the reorientation of agricultural 
production away from local needs to external markets was not, of 
course, unique to Ireland, but became a general feature of 
dependent peripheral economies. Similar disasters, for example, 
were a common occurrence in nineteenth-century India. 
The population 'adjustment' engendered by the Irish Famine 
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continued throughout the rerrlaihdet ·()f the nineteenth century 
when there was consistently heavy emigration, particularly from 
the western small-farm region. Thus, Ireland now became a 
supplier of cheap wage labour as well as a supplier of food to the 
industrial core (although much of the flow of labour was directed 
to the emerging core of the United States rather than to the estab-
lished core of Britain). This flood of emigration also acted as a 
safety valve, assuaging the revolutionary potential of the under-
classes of rural Ireland, a process which was further augmented 
by the transfer of outright land ownership to Ireland's tenant 
farmers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The 
movement for land reform had originated among the small farmers 
in western Ireland, and initially sought quite radical objectives, 
including land redistribution. The movement was subsequently 
taken over by the large commercial farming interests, and its aims 
were reduced to seeking the transfer of existing holdings from 
tenancies to outright proprietorships. As a result, the eventual 
resolution of the land question did nothing to solve the economic 
problems of the bulk of Irish farmers, who continued to occupy 
tiny holdings, on which they produced young cattle for sale, via 
an unequal exchange relationship, to cattle dealers and .cattle 
fatteners elsewhere. However, it did have the effect of creating a 
mass of conservative property-owning peasants who have domi-
nated the Irish political scene until recently. 
The second half of the nineteenth century saw the final parting 
of the way, in terms of economic structure, between Northeast 
Ireland and the remainder of the island. The mechanisation of the 
linen industry induced the establishment of a supplementary 
engineering industry which, in turn, attracted a major ship-
building sector to the region. Belfast and the surrounding satellite 
towns, therefore, became a classic specialised urban-industrial 
region typical of the industrial revolution. In 1800, Belfast had a 
population of barely 20,000; by 1900 it had reached 350,000, by -
which stage it had surpassed Dublin (Pringle, 1985: 196 -7). The 
Belfast region, therefore, had become an integral part of the 
British industrial core, in contradistinction to the remainder of 
Ireland (including much of Ulster), which remained firmly in the 
underdeveloped periphery. 
Interlude: Economic nationalism 
The late nineteenth century saw a significant rise in per capita 
incomes in rural Ireland, due to a combination of outmigration of 
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underemployed labour, growing aghculti1"fal prosperity, and a 
burgeoning flow of emigrants' remittances (Walsh, 1980a). This 
generated a corresponding growth in imports of British consumer 
goods, facilitated by the development of an extensive railway 
network. The possibility of supplying this growing market with 
indigenously-produced goods was not lost on certain elements 
within the native petty bourgeoisie, and became the principal 
plank of a new nationalist movement centred on the Sinn Fein 
('We ourselves') organisation, founded in 1906. The upwelling of 
nationalist sentiment following the 1916 Rising produced a surge 
in political support for Sinn Fein. As had happened in the case of 
the land reform movement of the late nineteenth century, the 
commercial farmers and their merchant associates - whose need 
for British markets was at odds with Sinn Fein's protectionist 
policies - became involved in the independence movement in 
order to curb and dilute its more radical objectives. This broad 
front political alliance proved too strong for the British govern-
ment to resist; however, for the industrial northeast (for whom 
access to the markets of Britain and its colonies was of essential 
importance) Sinn Fein's policies of economic nationalism were 
anathema and were resisted fiercely. This created the basis for 
partition, with the 26 southern counties attaining independence in 
1922, with the remaining six northern counties remaining within 
the United Kingdom. 
As was to happen frequently in subsequent cases of decolonis-
ation elsewhere, the temporary broad front alliance which had 
been formed in the south split almost immediately upon the 
attainment of independence. The faction which assumed power 
represented mainly the commercial farming and mercantile 
interests, a classic comprador bourgeoisie whose main concern 
was the creation of stable conditions for the resumption of normal 
trading relations with Britain. Representing the dominant econ-
omic interests in the new state, the new government placed the 
emphasis on agricultural development, and made only token 
gestures towards the Sinn Fein policies of industrialisation via 
protectionism. 
However, the onset of international depression in the early 
1930s provided the opportunity for the other main faction to gain 
power and implement the original Sinn Fein policy of economic 
· nationalism. This faction reflected the interests of the (largely 
embryonic) 'national' bourgeoisie, but was able to gain political 
power by enunciating populist policies in favour of the small 
farmers and urban working class. Tariff barriers were erected to 
provide protection for incipient home-based manufacturers, and 
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laws were passed to ensure that the tatter-would be Irish -owned 
and controlled. Initially, this policy met with some success: manu-
facturing employment (which accounted for less than 10% of the 
workforce in the south at the time of partition) grew by 50% 
between 1926 and 1951. 
However, further progress on the road to indigenous industrial-
isation quickly fell foul of a number of obstacles which may be 
seen as the inheritance of the colonial legacy (Walsh, 1980b). Low 
general incomes and a small and still declining population (less 
than three millions in 1951) prevented the attainment of the 
economies of scale which might have facilitated the subsequent 
penetration of export markets, as had happened with other 
countries which had initially industrialised behind protective 
barriers. Besides reducing the overall population, emigration 
selectively removed the most enterprising members of the 
population: to quote Oldham's (1914: 213-4) memorable phrase, 
'there had been, in Ireland, a perpetual survival of the unfittest, a 
steady debasement of the human currency ... ' The spurt of 
industrial growth in the 1930s and 1940s did not reflect a wide-
spread spirit of innovative enterprise among the new national 
bourgeoisie; rather, it represented the risk-free exploitation of 
guaranteed markets in basic consumer goods made available by 
protective legislation. Once these markets had been satisfied, 
further industrial investment ground to a virtual halt. 
But perhaps the most fundamental constraint of all on indigen-
ous industrial development deriving from the colonial heritage 
was the continuing concentration of the country's capital assets in 
the hands of the ultra-conservative agricultural and mercantile 
elite, to whom risk-taking investment was anathema (Lee, 1969). 
Most of these assets were invested in foreign banks and govern-
ment stocks; indeed, foreign investments by Irish nationals 
greatly exceeded Ireland's total national income. Mobilisation of 
these assets - as had happened in Germany in the late 
nineteenth century - could have financed the successful pursuit 
of independent development; however, for all its overt populist 
radicalism, Eamonn de Valera's ruling Fianna Fail party was noi 
prepared to tackle Ireland's propertied establishment. 
Ireland's rather tentative attempt at economic autarky, there-
fore, ran out of steam in the 1950s. At a time when the rest of 
Europe was booming, the Irish economy stagnated. Relative to 
the size of the base population, the emigration rate reached 
unprecedented levels. The deepening crisis required new econ-
omic departures. Proposals to base further industrial growth on 
large-scale processing of foodstuffs by state enterprise were 
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rejected by an almost totally- conservafi've political system. 
Instead, the decision was made to re-engage Ireland fully in the 
international capitalist system. 
Phase 3: The 'new' international division of labour 
In the late 1950s, the Irish government embarked on a new 
economic development policy which represented a direct reversal 
of the protectionism of the previous quarter century. Henceforth, 
the objective was to be the creation of an export-oriented indus-
trial base through the attraction of foreign investment. Generous 
tax concessions and capital grants were to be the main formal 
incentives to be offered to outside firms, along with plentiful and 
relatively cheap labour (at a time when labour elsewhere in 
Western Europe was becoming scarce and expensive). An ener-
getic promotion agency, the Industrial Development Authority, 
was entrusted with the task of securing appropriate industrial 
projects from external sources. 
The new policy gradually gathered momentum through the 
1960s, and when Ireland joined the EEC in 1973, there was a 
marked acceleration of inward investment, as transnational 
companies sought to exploit Ireland's position as a low-cost base 
for supplying the EEC market (Telesis Consultancy Group, 1982: 
135). By 1984, some 850 foreign firms had located in Ireland, 
representing a total investment of IR£7.5 billions and employing 
80,000 workers - over one third of all manufacturing employ-
ment (Industrial Development Authority, 1985a). Indeed, foreign 
firms accounted for the entire growth (34%) in manufacturing 
employment between 1961 and 1981. Expansion in indigenous 
manufacturing employment had been stymied by a major shake-
out among those indigenous firms which had been established 
during the protectionist period due to their inability to withstand 
outside competition in the new free trade conditions they had to 
face in the recessionary mid-1970s. The United States has been by 
far the leading source of foreign investment in Ireland, accounting 
for almost 40% of plants, over 40% of employment and over 50% 
of investment. The United Kingdom and West Germany are the 
other leading sources, but there is also a wide range of invest-. 
ments, mainly from Western Europe, Japan and Canada. 
The new foreign plants are mainly concentrated in expanding, 
high-technology sectors (such as electronics, engineering and 
pharmaceuticals) in contrast with the traditional firms (mainly 
engaged in textiles, footwear, and clothing) which they replaced. 
1: I 
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Not only are they much larger; on average, than indigenous 
plants, but they are also much more productive and export-
oriented: while accounting for one third of manufacturing 
employment, they contribute one half of manufacturing output 
and 80% of non-food manufacturing exports (Industrial Develop-
ment Authority, 1985b). Foreign firms, in fact, export over 90% of 
their Irish output, thus fulfilling the Irish government's objective 
of using such firms to create an export-oriented industrial base. 
On the other hand, foreign firms also import over 80% of their 
material inputs, thus confirming that they are using Ireland as a 
classic export platform, with very limited linkages with the 
domestic economy. 
The failure of foreign firms to develop supply linkages with 
indigenous firms has been ascribed in some quarters to deficiencies 
within the indigenous industrial sector (Telesis Consultancy 
Group, 1982: 118-20). At the same time, it is clear that a major 
factor in favour of maintaining external backward and forward 
linkages is the facility this provides for manipulating intra-
corporate transfer prices in order to fully exploit Ireland's tax 
concessions. Thus, foreign firms whose operations are vertically-
integrated find it in their interests to import their inputs at 
artificially low prices and export their output at inflated prices, in 
order to concentrate their profits in Ireland (Murphy, 1984; 
O'Leary, 1984). The extent to which foreign firms based in Ireland 
trade with affiliate companies abroad is already well documented. 
McAleese (1977: 36 -7) shows that three quarters of foreign firms 
in Ireland trade with overseas affiliates, to whom they send 68% 
of their exports, and from whom they obtain some 40% of their 
imports. Of U.S. firms, 85% trade with overseas affiliates, which 
account for 86% of their exports and over 50% of their imports. 
The existence of a considerable level of transfer price manipu-
lation on the part of foreign firms located in Ireland is attested to 
by their high level of profitability (although some of this may also 
be attributed to other favourable aspects of the Irish operating 
environment). Thus, in 1983, the profits of foreign firms as a 
proportion of sales were 16.5 times higher than those of 
indigenous Irish firms (Industrial Development Authority, 1985b). 
For U.S. firms - those most likely to be involved in transfer price 
manipulation - the ratio was 22:1. In 1983, American subsidiaries 
located in Ireland reported a rate of return on investment of 24% 
- six times the overall average for U.S. subsidiaries in the EEC 
(Sunday Tribune, November 4, 1984, quoting the U.S. Department 
of Commerce's Survey of Current Business). . 
Given their major contribution to Ireland's external trade, 
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foreign firms have, by understating the value of imports and over-
stating that of exports, produced an unprecedented surplus in 
Ireland's visible trade balance in recent years. Counterbalancing 
this, however, has been an accelerating flow of profit repatriation 
from Ireland - up from IR£228M in 1979 to JR£1,360M (the 
equivalent of 8.4% of total GNP) in 1986. In the earlier years of 
foreign investment in Ireland, foreign firms reinvested a high 
proportion of profits locally, as they built up their operations to 
target levels. In recent years, however, up to 80% of the profits of 
foreign firms have been repatriated (Industrial Development 
Authority, 1985b). 
When foreign investment inflows were running at a high level 
in the 1970s and employment was rising, the Irish government 
was quite happy with the direct employment created by foreign 
firms. In the 1980s, however, with new investment falling back 
considerably, unemployment rising (to average levels of almost 
20% in the late eighties, despite a resumption in net emigration), 
and increasing strains being placed on the domestic economy by 
the need to service a burgeoning foreign debt (equal to 60% of 
GNP at the end of 1987) there has been growing concern about the 
lack of domestic economic spin-offs from foreign investment. 
Apart from the high level of profit repatriation (which means that 
surplus generated in Ireland - even if much of it is artificial - is 
reinvested to create economic growth elsewhere), the main 
deficiencies of foreign firms in Ireland are neatly summarised in 
the following passage from a major review of Irish industrial 
policy commissioned by the Irish government: 
Foreign-owned industrial operations in Ireland with few 
exceptions do not embody the key competitive activities 
of the businesses in which they participate; do not 
employ significant numbers of skilled workers; and are 
not significantly integrated into traded and skilled sub-
supply industries in Ireland. (Telesis Consultancy 
Group, 1982: 151) 
In other words, apart from having a low level of material linkages 
with the indigenous economy, foreign manufacturing plants 
located in Ireland are mainly involved in low-skill assembly and 
testing operations with minimal research and development, little 
independent marketing capacity, and limited decision-making 
administrative functions. Such a profile clearly places Ireland in 
the dependent periphery within the 'new' international division 
of labour which has emerged since the 1960s. By specialising in 
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production functions - both- primary' ·and secondary - where 
average income levels are lower, Ireland is consigned to an 
economic status which is permanently inferior to that of the core 
areas of economic power which increasingly specialise in high-
level tertiary activities and which receive the highest levels of 
remuneration. Given the absence of the latter activities, Ireland's 
ability ever to close the gap with the core regions is rendered 
increasingly difficult. 
An important aspect of Ireland's position in the new inter-
national division of labour has been a shift in the core with respect 
to which Ireland's peripheral status is defined. The creation, and 
subsequent enlargement, of the EEC has led to the gradual 
emergence of a coherent core- periphery structure within 
, Western Europe focussed on the so-called 'Golden Triangle' 
linking, roughly, Brussels, Stuttgart and Hamburg. As one moves 
out from this central core, there is a gradual growth of both 
geographical and economic peripherality. Other regions with a 
similar relative location to Ireland's (such as Southern Italy and 
Portugal) have also been experiencing a similar transition from a 
. specialisation in primary production and emigration to dependent 
industrialisation, although the specific form which this has taken 
has varied from case to case (Lewis and Williams, 1981; Dunford, 
1986). 
The evolution of this West European core- periphery structure 
has been accompanied by an increasing interpenetration of 
national capitals within the core region and the emergence of truly 
multinational corporate entities (in terms of ownership and 
control). This is a development of major historical significance, as 
it marks a fundamental departure from the previous tendency for 
capitalist corporations to have particular national affiliations and 
to be subject to particular national politicial influences. The 
impending creation of a 'Single European (i.e. EEC) Market' by 
1992 could accelerate the movement towards eventual West 
European political union; accordingly, the current pattern of 
nation-states (which tends to hinder the process of international 
capitalist integration) may not be as rigid as has sometimes been 
suggested (e.g. Smith, 1984: 143-4). 
The reorientation of Ireland's external economic links towards 
• the new multinational European core has been greatly accelerated 
by the recent economic decline of Britain, which had previously 
monopolised these links. In 1924, 98% of Irish exports went to, 
and 80% of imports came from, the United Kingdom. By 1964, the 
corresponding figures were 71% and 51%, respectively. In 1986, 
the UK accounted for only 34% of Irish exports and 42% of 
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imports, by which time the rerrtairider .. of the EEC received 38% 
of Irish exports and generated 26% of imports. The reorientation 
of the Irish economy to serve the EEC heartland has been 
accompanied by a deterioration of Ireland's economic position 
relative to that heartland, as has been the general experience of 
the EEC's peripheral regions (Keeble et al., 1982). Thus, between 
1973 and 1979, Ireland's GDP per capita (measured in purchasing 
power parities) fell from 65% to 61 o/o of the EEC average (Foley 
and Walbridge, 1981). Were it not for EEC financial assistance (in 
1979, net payments of grants and subsidies - mainly agricultural 
- amounted to almost 7% of Ireland's GNP), the relative position 
would have been much worse. 
The role of spatial unevenness in capitalist development 
The foregoing case study has illustrated the changing nature of 
the process of uneven development within the capitalist system. 
While the nature of the links between core and periphery has 
evolved, as has the geography of the core- periphery structure, the 
core- periphery system itself has continued (Wallerstein, 1979). 
This raises the question as to how central such a system is to the 
fundamental functioning of capitalism. Marx, of course, was a 
firm believer in an inherent tendency towards equalisation within 
capitalism, and appeared to extend this belief· to the spatial 
dimension, as suggested by his expectation that, in time, India 
would evolve into an independent capitalist pdwer (Smith, 1984: 
94). While the latter expectation remains far from realisation, the 
emergence of alternative centres of capitalist power in the 
previously underdeveloped Asian periphery (Taiwan, South 
Korea) provides some evidence in support of the equalisation 
tendency. 
At the same time, the tendency for the development gap 
between cores and peripheries to widen (as in the case of Ireland 
vis-a-vis the European core, outlined above) appears to be much 
more in evidence today. Smith (1984) has argued that capitalism 
requires the constant production and reproduction of uneven 
development, in order to periodically reinvigorate the process of • 
capital accumulation through the provision of outlets for high-
profit investment. Across-the-board equalisation, he argues, 
would involve a general reduction in profit levels, chronic 
stagnation in the accumulation process, and potentially terminal 
crisis. Smith, therefore, proposes a 'see-saw' model of uneven 
development, whereby capital moves from highly-developed 
I 
I 
I. 
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regions of low profitability to les'!Fdeveloped regions of high 
profitability which, eventually, will culminate in a reversal of roles 
bet':Veen these categories of regions and a reversal of capital flows 
in a future time period. Thus, regions will find themselves being 
systematically developed and underdeveloped in rotation. 
Smith's scenario appears to indicate a cyclical pattern of invest-
ment and disinvestment, which suggests a possible correspon-
dence with Kondratiev long waves of capitalist development. 
However, these latter are not the rhythmic cycles of a stable 
system, but a system undergoing continuous long-term expan-
sion (albeit experiencing recurrent short-term setbacks). Each 
successive long wave portrays progressively more sophisticated 
, forms of technology and business organisation which, in turn, 
produce new and coherent spatial patterns of investment which 
depart significantly - if not fundamentally - from anything that 
has gone before. There would appear to be little historical 
evidence (in the era of industrial capitalism) of the 'see-saw' 
pattern of development postulated by Smith, which suggests a 
tendency for investment to switch backwards and forwards 
between two sets of regions. 
Rather, the historical trajectory being followed by capitalist 
development would seem to involve a gradual deepening of 
capitalism on a global scale, with capitalist social relations 
progressively penetrating all areas and aspects of everyday living 
(with the possible exception of some social formations where 
socialism is being built). Smith (1984: 139) himself has eloquently 
acknowledged this trend: 
The world market based on exchange is transformed 
into a world economy based on production and the 
universality of wage labour. Spatial integration through 
the price mechanisms of the commercial market ... is 
increasingly infiltrated and replaced at a more funda-
mental level by spatial integration through the law of 
value. 
While Rosa Luxemburg expected that capitalism would not 
survive without having non-capitalist societies to exploit (Smith, 
1984: 95), the universalisation of the capitalist mode of production 
does not presage either the collapse of capitalism or the spatial 
equalisation of capitalist development. The expansion of capital-
ism is associated with a continuing process of concentration of 
ownership and control of the means of production and exchange 
in the form of giant transnational corporate entities, which 
.• 
. ,
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become fewer and fewer with tne ongoing··operation of the 
mechanisms of takeover and merger. With this concentration of 
control in the hands of a contracting number of dominant 
corporations, a small number of urban centres wherein the 
headquarters functions of these corporations are located have 
emerged as the effective core regions of modern capitalism 
(Cohen, 1981; Hymer, 1972). These 'global cities' account for only 
a tiny proportion of the total number of people incorporated -
either directly or indirectly - into the increasingly integrated 
world capitalist system, but include in their populations the 
recipients of the highest personal incomes in that system, in the 
form of top-level corporate functionaries and associated providers 
of business and sociocultural services. 
With the increasing integration of capitalism on a worldwide 
scale, we are witnessing the evolution of a truly global central 
place system, with a coherent international central place hierarchy 
through which information is assembled and distributed, and 
through which decisions are filtered downwards and surplus 
is extracted upwards. This is essentially a more complex and 
sophisticated version of the metropolis/satellite structure ident-
ified over two decades ago by Frank (1969: 3 -17). Whereas con-
ventional functionalist geographers have tended to portray the 
central place system as involving a symbiotic relationship between 
town and countryside, the scenario depicted here sees central 
places as devices to facilitate control and exploitation. 
In this scenario, spatially uneven development would appear to 
be an essential ingredient of capitalist development. However, in 
social terms, it may be that, apart from an elite minority involved 
in control functions at various levels in the hierarchy, the 
tendency will be towards equalisation. As technological change 
reduces the skill levels of most production and service workers 
and broadens the range of locations within which their work can 
be done, and as capitalist relations embrace a growing proportion 
of the world's workers, whether in urban or rural areas, a general 
levelling out of wages may be in prospect. 
In the case of Ireland, the diffusion of capitalist production has 
generated very significant increases in absolute living standards, 
while deindustrialisation elsewhere has reduced living standards, 
as unemployment has grown and workers' bargaining powers 
have been attenuated. Nevertheless, Irish living standards have 
yet to reach those which still prevail in the deindustrialised 
regions of advanced economies, and while a trend towards 
convergence is in evidence, it is doubtful whether the logic of 
capitalism would allow Ireland (or any other region experiencing a 
II 
II 
II 
I j 
140 PROINNSIAS BREATHNACH 
similar form of development) to surpass the latter regions, w!-ticrr··. 
are increasingly making themselves available for the same kind 
branch-plant industrialisation. What is clear, however, is 
regions like Ireland have no prospect, given the current processes 
of uneven development, of ever closing the gap between them-
selves and the dominant core regions of international capitalism .. :: 
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